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[I]t has been no easy job for a big developing country like China with a
population of nearly 1.3 billion to have so considerably improved its human rights situation in such a short period of time.
-President Hu Jintao, People's Republic of China.'
I. THE DILEMMA OF CHINESE DEMOCRACY
A great deal has been written on the question of Chinese democracy. In
practice and theory, democracy in China is enormously significant.2 This is
because China is a rising military threat whose interests are often counter to
those of the United States, as well as a demographic powerhouse with as
much as a quarter of the world's population.
In Mainland China, "the current official mythology.., holds that Chinese culture and democracy are incompatible." 3 Many Mainland Chinese
apparently believe that China's Confucian traditions are inconsistent with
democratic practices--an idea with a pedigree that traces both to China's
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2. SHAOHUA Hu, EXPLAINING CHINESE DEMOCRATIZATION 1 (2000).
3. Ilya Garger, Speaking Out for China's "Cussed" Characters, THE ASAHI SHINBUM,
available at http://www.asahi.com/english/culture/K2002011800265.htm (last visited May
12, 2002).
4. Bruce J. Dickson, Democratic Development in Taiwan: A Model for the PRC?,
PACNET NEwsLETTER No. 43, Oct. 27, 2000, at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0043.htmI (last
visited May 12, 2002).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003

1

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 3
172
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 33

great ancient philosophies 5 and its most prominent modem political theorist.6
It is undeniably the case that the government of the People's Republic of
China shares key features with both the Nationalist and Imperial Chinese
constitutions.7 "One important similarity in each of these constitutions ...is
that the state holds and grants power to the citizens."8 The belief that the
state is the font of individual rights supports widespread Far Eastern commentary that Western-style democracy is incompatible with so-called "Asian
values." A quartet of prominent scholars on China explained this consensus
in 1995:
By "China's conditions," participants usually meant that China is geographically and demographically large, that it is backward (at least in certain areas) and that it carries a long history of authoritarianism. Among
other things, participants often argued that China is too big for elections,
that it has too few lawyers for an adversarial court system, that its national
security situation is too difficult to permit constitutional control of foreign
affairs, and that its economic challenges preclude immediate fulfillment of
human civil and political rights, much less social and economic rights.
Some participants went so far as to argue that China's
authoritarian tradi9
tion wholly precludes a truly constitutional system.
There has been little movement with respect to this notion, at least in the
Orient. Indeed, many in Asia "question the value of democracy and quite
strongly challenge the validity of Western notions of democratization and
even human rights."'" Such strong negative reactions represent a serious obstacle to the reforms desired by the West."
If it is true that China cannot sustain democracy, one of the key normative assumptions of the West is significantly undermined. U.S. foreign policy-under both Democratic and Republican administrations-assumes that
all people are inherently capable of participating meaningfully in an open
society. "All programs must be democracy/human rights sensitive, at the
very least doing no harm and preferably contributing positively to democra-

5. See Hu, supra note 2, at 36 ("Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism, and Taoism contained
some democratic elements, but none qualified as being democratic because of their failure to
advocate popular sovereignty and individual liberty.").
6. ANDREW J.NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 46, 60-61 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1985)
(discussing Liang Qichao, China's "most influential modem political thinker").
7. See generally id. at 108-09 (table summarizing Chinese constitutions and rights).
8. Robert C. Berring, Farewell to All That, 19 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 431, 441
(1997).
9. R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, J.Paul Martin & Andrew J.Nathan, Symposium on
China and Constitutionalism:Introduction, 9 J.CHINESE L. 1, 4 (1995).
10. Farhana Y. Khera, Democratization and InternationalLaw: Building the Institutions
of Civil Society, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 197, 197 (1994) (remarks by Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
11. Dickson, supra note 4 ("This pessimistic attitude has placed tremendous inertia on
the prospects for democratization.").
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tization interests. ' 12 Though we may not always live up to the ideal, "[w]e
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."' 3
In the face of this apparent cultural consensus that Chinese democracy is
impossible, however, empirical evidence demonstrates rather strongly that
Chinese cultural values are perfectly compatible with democracy. Taiwan is
a thriving democracy composed largely of ethnic Mainlanders who fled the
Communists in 1949. l4 The Communists recognize that fact and consider
Taiwan's democratic developments an implicit challenge to their authority
and legitimacy. 5 The Republic of China's 2000 presidential election-the
first democratic, peaceful transition of power in the history of China in Taiwan or on the Mainland-fatally undermined the Communist Party's longstanding claim that democracy is inconsistent with Chinese values. 6 Hong
Kong, similarly, existed as a functioning democracy (albeit with British
overseers) until retrocession to the Mainland in 1997.7
Moreover, the Chinese government has made gestures toward democracy since at least the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, building on a democratic tradition that stretches back to 1895.' Changing from a
dynastic to a communist system resulted in the introduction of a "new democracy."' 9 Though Mao Zedong was not a true democrat, he regularly
sought philosophical cover by referring to his schemes as "mass democracy"
and the like.2' And Mao's "totalitarianism unintentionally made it possible
and necessary to move toward democracy: possible because democratization
presupposes a strong state; necessary because his rule inflicted so many disasters on the Chinese that they desired an alternative system."21 This reform
took place under Deng Xiaoping. Deng intended to liberalize China's econ-

12. Khera, supra note 10, at 199 (comments by Larry Garber, Senior Policy Adviser on
Democracy, U.S. Agency for International Development).
13. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see THE FEDERALIST No.
22, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("The fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of
national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority.") (emphasis in original).
14. See generally Lee Teng-hui, UnderstandingTaiwan, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999,
at 9 (former president of Taiwan discussing the history of political difficulties between Taiwan and Mainland China); Linda Jakobson, The Taiwan that Beijing Doesn't Want to See,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2000, at B01 ("[Miore than three-quarters of Taiwan's 22 million people trace their ancestry to the Southern Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.").
15. Kurt M. Campbell & Derek J. Mitchell, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?, FOREIGN AFF.,
July-Aug. 2001, at 14, 17.
16. Id.
17. See William I. Friedman, China's One Country, Two Systems ParadigmExtends Itself Beyond the Mainland's Borders to the Southern Provincial Government of Hong Kong,
11 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 65, 66, 76 (2001).
18. NATHAN, supra note 6, at x.
19. Hu, supranote 2, at 100.
20. Id. at 111-12.
21. Id. at 113.
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omy, not the political sphere, though he too paid lip service to democracy.2 2
Although Deng's objective in reforming the economy was to make the government appear more legitimate, the reformation instead weakened the government and made democracy more attractive.2 3 This is true because "capitalist development transforms the class structure, enlarging the working and
middle classes and facilitating their self-organization, thus making it more
difficult for elites to exclude them politically."24 As a question of economic
organization,
Mainland China has long since ceased to practice Commu25
nism.
II. THE PRESSURES TO BECOME DEMOCRATIC
Mainland China is no longer truly "communist," though it is not yet
democratic. As a consequence, the Chinese regime faces significant pressures from abroad. First and foremost, worldwide democratization remains
official U.S. State Department policy. "[T]he United States seeks to
[p]romote democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity for the entire world." 26 The governmental and non-governmental armature of the United States seems to have the same eventual goal in mind: the
rule of law is seen as a reasonable means of fostering democracy in China by
the State
Department, academics, commentators and most human rights ac27
tivists.
Relevant international law also favors democracy. The United Nations'
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone has the right
to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 28 It goes on to explain, "[t]he will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 29

22. Id. at 129-30.
23. Id. at 128.
24. Evelyne Huber et al., The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy, 7 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 71, 83 (1993).
25. S. David Cooper, The Dot.Com(munist) Revolution: Will the Internet Bring Democracy to China?, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 98, 109-10 (2000) ("[C]entral control has been
loosened so much over the economy that some experts wonder if China is truly a communist
country at all. In the beginning of the 1990s, there was a higher percentage of output from
China's private sector than in the emerging post-communist democracies.").
26.

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POLICY ON

DEMOCRACY, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/ (last visited May 14, 2002).
27. Harry Williams, Property Rights and Legal Reform in Township and Village Enterprises in China, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 227, 229 (2001).

28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 (1), G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
29. Id. art. 21(3).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss2/3

4

Bloch and TerBush: Democracy in the Cities: A New Proposal for Chinese Reform

2003]

A NEW PROPOSAL FOR CHINESE REFORM

Similarly, the United Nations-sponsored International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights expressly ensures electoral democracy.3 °
Thus, Western policy broadly holds that China should become democratic.3 1 This normative assertion is bolstered by the evidence of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and the short-lived democracy movement it
spawned nationwide.3 2 It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Chinese
people believe China should become democratic, too. The Taiwanese certainly think so:
Only nations willing to relinquish the known certainties of old-style authoritarianism for the unknowns of modern democracy can ultimately enjoy the flexibility, efficiency, and transparency necessary to meet the
competitive challenges of globalization sweeping the world today ....

It is

in the best interest of regional and even global peace and
33 stability for Bei-

jing to embrace democracy rather than try to contain it.

The people of Hong Kong evidently agree, 34 and even Mainland Chinese elites seem to favor the notion. "Freedom is in fashion in China, but so
is the fear of it. The crucial questions on every [Chinese] thinking man's
mind are: how much is too much and where will it all lead? 3 5 Rapid democratization might lead to instability and chaos that would undermine rapid
economic development;36 on the other hand, a higher standard of living may
be a better guarantor of stable democracy 37 -albeit a democracy longer in
coming.

30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 25, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179. China is not a signatory. Louis HENKIN ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 151 (3d ed. 1993).
31. Hu, supra note 2, at 5-7.
32. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Role of Legal Rhetoric in the Failure of
Democratic Change in China, 2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 231, 253-62 (1996) (discussing the legality
and effect of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations); W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tiananmen:
Chinese Human Rights and the United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1575, 1576
(1989) ("On June 4, 1989, China's 27th Army brutally crushed democracy demonstrations
that had extended for seven weeks in Beijing and other Chinese cities."); THE TIANANMEN
PAPERS (Andrew J. Nathan et al. eds., 2001).
33. Lee, supra note 14, at 14.
34. Carole J. Petersen, Preserving Institutionsof Autonomy in Hong Kong: The Impact of
1997 on Academia and the Legal Profession, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 337, 367 (1998) ("Of course,
in the long term Hong Kong people hope that their freedoms will be enjoyed by all of
China.").
35. Brian Mitchell, Chinese Communists Discover Hope in Forgotten American Conservative, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 25, 2000, at Al.
36. Mancur Olson, Jr., Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, 23 J. ECON. HIST. 529,
530-31 (1963).
37. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 45-72 (1960); Robert Barro, Democracy and Growth, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 1 (1996).
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China has a modest history of democratic reforms in the early 1900s,

which it could perhaps build upon. 38 But with or without that history, some

warn that China is faced with a stark choice between liberalization and
chaos. "Further efforts to resist political change will only squander the benefits of social and economic dynamism, perpetuate the government's costly
battle to contain the populace, drive politics toward increasingly tense do39
mestic confrontation, and ultimately threaten the system with collapse."
That said, China's historical conditions and level of development have
not been especially favorable for democracy. 4 Deng Xiaoping crushed
China's first modem democratic movement in the 1980s, concluding that the
aims of the (primarily urban) radical students and workers, if enacted, would
undermine state socialism. 4' Following the 1980 debacle (and, later, the Tiananmen crackdown), many commentators within and outside the Chinese
leadership advanced the defensive idea that China is not yet ready for fullscale democratic reforms.42 They urged that people work within the system
rather than trying to overthrow it. "Chinese intellectuals now distinguish between 'liberals' and 'democrats.' Democrats want to change the political
system-in plainer words, to overthrow the party. Liberals just want the
party to open up a little more. '43 Following this line, some Western scholars
still push the adoption of greater "intraparty democracy" rather than true pluralism." There is some empirical support for this idea. In practice, China's
rulers now must build support for new policies among party members, business leaders and other influential citizens, regional leaders, and the general
public .45

President Hu's comment also rings true. China is still a Third World
country. 46 While literacy rates are high," as much as two-thirds of China's

38. Hu, supra note 2, at 2 ("Before the 1911 Revolution, elected assemblies were successively established at the local, provincial, and national levels."); see id. at 50-51.

39. George Gilboy & Eric Heginbotham, China's Coming Transformation, FOREIGN
AFF., July-Aug. 2001, at 26.
40. Hu, supra note 2, at 23 ("[I]t is not an exaggeration to say that China's general conditions were not conducive to democracy.").
41. A compelling account of the brief and, in retrospect, inevitable 1980 crackdown may
be found in NATHAN, supra note 6, at 193-223.
42. See Hu, supra note 2, at 8-9 (discussing scholarly analyses of obstacles to democracy
in China).
43. Mitchell, supra note 35.
44. Gilboy & Heginbothan, supranote 39, at 27.
45.

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PAC. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:

CHINA (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2742pf.htm [hereinafter
BACKGROUND NOTE].

46. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
THE DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR RURAL CHINA (Oct. 2001),
translatedat www.chinaembassy.org.il/eng/32276.html (last visited May 12, 2002) [hereinafter POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAM] ("China is a developing country, and it has a long way to
go to shake off poverty.").
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working-age population is employed in subsistence agriculture.4 8 Gross domestic product is only $4,300 per person,49 while the majority of Chinese
live on less than $1,000 a year.5"
Large-scale Chinese political reforms over the past decades were intended primarily to ensure that a Mao-style dictator can no longer arise, and
to facilitate the transition to a market economy.5' Viewed as a process, it
now remains only to expand the scope of free political (as opposed to economic) discourse-but this is, of course, reform's greatest challenge.52 Ushering in democracy in a developing nation of almost 1.3 billion5 3 is no easy
task; if not managed properly, democratization could lead54to bloodshed not
seen in the Middle Kingdom since the Cultural Revolution.
III. DEMOCRACY VERSUS DEVELOPMENT
The developing world is littered with the ghosts of failed attempts at
democracy-instances where de jure democracy never became de facto. A
critical lesson from Greek history in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War is that democracy is capable of contributing to catastrophic failure.55 The framers of the U.S. Constitution kept this firmly in mind when
they designed the multiple checks, balances and other safeguards that characterize America's successful democracy.

47. Cooper, supra note 25, at 113 ("The Chinese are highly educated. They have a literacy rate of 81.5% and excel at science and engineering."); see CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK
2002: CHINA, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last
visited May 14, 2002) [hereinafter CIA FACTBOOK].
48. Estimates range from half to over two-thirds. Compare CIA FACTBOOK, supra note
47, and ECONOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES, 124 (2002) (fifty percent of the Chinese labor force is employed in the agricultural sector), with INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE
COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY IN CHINA (Apr.
2002), translated at www.chinaembassy.org/il/eng/32231.html (last visited May 12, 2002)
[hereinafter LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY] ("Employees in urban areas accounted for 32.8
percent of the total, and those in rural areas for 67.2 percent.").
49. CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 47.
50. POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES, supra note 48, at 124 (GDP per head is $790).
51. Minxin Pei, Is China Democratizing?,FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 68, 73.
52. Id. at 77 ("The most challenging aspect of political reform in post-Mao China was the
restructuring of relations between the state and society and the establishment of institutions of
democratic participation.").
53. LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 48 ("By the end of 2001, the country's
population had reached 1.27627 billion.., excluding Hong Kong and Macao...").
54. BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 45. "[T]he 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' . . . was unprecedented in communist history. For the first time, a section of the Chinese
communist leadership sought to rally popular opposition against another leadership group.
China was set on a course of political and social anarchy that lasted the better part of a decade." Id.
55. THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
127-28 (Robert B. Strassler ed., 1996).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33

178

Some dispute whether democracy goes hand in hand with rapid development. This is particularly so in Asia, where, in addition to the concept of
"Asian values" discussed above, many support the closely-related "Lee thesis," attributed to Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. According to the Lee thesis, the denial of basic civil and political rights is advantageous to economic development.56 The statistical support for this

assertion, however, is fairly weak.5" Many have found strong evidence that
democracy promotes economic growth. 58 Most likely, the impact of full democracy on development is indeterminate,59 possibly because "regimes
themselves may be endogenous to the forces of development." 6
The empirical studies supporting the Lee thesis-though hotly debated 6 -find that while higher levels of wealth tend to result in higher levels
of democracy, countries with levels of democracy higher than their levels of
wealth dictate often experience a reduction of democracy.62 In other words,

countries that choose to develop before democratizing are more likely to end
up with both democracy and a higher level of development, whereas countries that democratize first are more likely to end up with neither:
Democracy-in the sense of political rights and civil liberties-is, in any
case, not the characteristic of institutions that matters most for economic
performance. There is some evidence that, starting from the worst dictatorships, an increase in democracy is favorable, on average, for economic
growth.... The favorable economic effects from democracy seem, however, to disappear once a country attains a moderate degree of liberalization, such as that characteristic in recent years of places such as Malaysia
and Mexico. Further expansions of democratic freedoms toward the Western ideal seem to come at the expense of economic growth.
This last finding is not surprising if one thinks of democracy as a setup in
which decisions are literally made by majority vote. Such a system tends
to favor redistributions from rich to poor and, more specifically, the expansion of social welfare programs that have typified and stifled Western
Europe. Such programs may have desirable aspects, but they come at the
cost of diluted incentives for investment, employment, and growth. 63

56. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 15, 148 (1999).

57. Id. at 152.
58. LIPSET, supra note 37, at 45-72.
59. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, PoliticalRegimes and Economic Growth, 7
J. EcON.PERSPECTIVES 51, 51 (1993).
60. Pranab

Bardhan,

Symposium on Democracy and Development, 7

J. ECON.

PERSPECTIvEs 45, 48 (1993).

61. Reginald Chua, Development and Democracy: The Debate Post-Crisis, Lecture Presented at the Research Institute for Asia and Pacific at the University of Sydney (Feb. 25,

2000) (transcript availableat www.riap.usyd.edu.au/events/mediademchua.htm).
62. Robert J. Barro, Democracy in Congo? Laugh On, HOOVER DIG., 1997 No. 4, available at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/974[barro2.html (last visited July
1, 2002).
63. Id.
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This statement harkens back to more radical arguments in the first half
of the nineteenth century, when many thought that universal suffrage would
threaten property rights, destroy the economy, and even threaten civilization. 6 Time has proven these views too extreme, thanks in no small part to
the checks and balances developed by the designers of the U.S. Constitution
and other democratic governments. However, there is certainly reason to
question whether democratization in undeveloped countries undermines the
development of property rights and other institutions that underpin successful economies.
However, even if early adoption of democracy in poor countries involves trade-offs in terms of economic development, citizens may be happier
with more democracy and a lower economic growth rate, preferring to give
up a certain amount of wealth for more freedom."
Particular policies associated with democratic governments tend to support economic growth and prosperity, such as "maintaining secure property
rights, promoting the rule of law, fostering free markets domestically and internationally, macroeconomic stability, and investments in education and
some forms of infrastructure." 66 Development efforts in Chile, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan suggest that these policies do not lead inexorably to democracy.67 Yet there is good evidence that material prosperity
eventually leads to sustainable expansions of democracy. 68 As Robert Barro
notes, "[e]ven China, as it becomes wealthier, is likely to expand its electoral
rights and civil liberties. 69
In short, democracy is often (though not always) a product of economic
development.7" While the statistical evidence is mixed, the broader empirical
picture is clear. Every developed country in the world is a stable democracy;
in the Third World, stable democracies remain the exception. 7' Even in
South Korea and Taiwan, many years of rapid development preceded democratization. At a minimum, economic development greatly increases the
probability of stable democracy: "With respect to the effects of economic
development on democracy, the analysis shows that improvements in the
standard of living ... substantially raise the probability that political institutions will become more democratic over time. Hence, political freedom
emerges as a sort of luxury good. 7 2

64. 17 THOMAS B. MACAULAY,
1900).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

COMPLETE WRITINGS

263-76 (Houghton, Mifflin and Co.

See SEN, supra note 56, at 151-52.
Barro, supra note 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LiPSET, supra note 37, at 45-72.
Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 59, at 62.
Barro, supra note 37, at 23-24.
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Because there is a substantial overlap between developed countries and
fully democratic countries, the question of whether democracy is good for
economic development pertains mostly to less developed countries. Even if
the Lee thesis is partially correct, it may soon be inapplicable to many parts
of China that are, or soon will be, developed, and ripe for democracy.
The Lee thesis also overlooks the freedom and human rights associated
with the adoption of a free market model.73 As in Taiwan and South Korea,
once Chinese citizens have become accustomed to exercising the rights and
freedoms inherent in capitalism, they may begin to expect and demand an
expansion of these freedoms in the form of democracy, free speech and similar rights.
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

74

If we accept that China should move toward democracy (and will soon
face increased pressure to do so), it still is not clear how to accomplish that
goal without the bloodshed and economic shocks President Hu rightly warns
against. The question is what level of economic development is necessary to
increase the likelihood that democracy will be peacefully and stably
adopted? If South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are any guide, several
Chinese cities have likely crossed this threshold. Thus, there is an interim
step between totalitarian rule and full-fledged democracy: democracy in the
cities.
China is an enormous landmass; at 3.7 million square miles,75 it is almost exactly the size of the United States. 76 It is also the oldest uninterrupted
civilization on Earth. 77 With very few exceptions, it has been politically unified for several thousand years.78 But the data on its current demographics
and economics paint a more fragmented picture:
China's economy has been described as a three-in-one economy. First,
more than 80% of China's people live in an 18th century agrarian society.
In many rural villages, especially in the west, roads are mere trails traveled
by mule-drawn carts and commerce is done in open-air markets .... Second, China also has a large 20th century industrial society. These industries are reminiscent of ones found in Detroit, Pittsburgh and other "bluecollar" towns Third 9China has only a very small 21st-century advanced
technology industry.1

73. SEN, supra note 56, at 24-30, 148-52.
74. VLADIMIR I. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1902).
75. BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 45.

76. China is 3,705,820 square miles; the United States is 3,717,796 square miles.
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD 33, 92 (7th ed. 1999).

77. Hu, supra note 2, at 23.
78. Unification under the Qin dynasty took place in 221 B.C. CIA FACTBOOK, supra note
47.
79. Cooper, supra note 25, at 99-100.
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The Mainland Chinese government acknowledges that economic development varies widely region by region. 8° Rural China is essentially Third
World, despite substantial efforts by the Chinese central government to alleviate rural poverty. 8' "The poverty of China's rural areas is a problem that
arose over long years in the past. Impoverished regions in China are characterized mainly by a large area and population sunk in poverty."82 By contrast, Beijing and the industrial cities of the coast (Shanghai and Guangzhou,
for example) are First World cities, with modern amenities and an educated,
active workforce. To some, China is experiencing a new "Gilded Age." 83
China's East Coast is by far the most developed region;84 eastern Chinese
cities bear more relation to Taipei than to China's vast rural backwaters.85
Indeed, as Taiwan lengthens and deepens its democratic experience, its role
as a model and an object lesson can only grow.86
There are several disgruntled constituencies in China: embattled student-democracy leaders in common cause with social or religious movements like Falun Gong, increasingly Western-oriented elites, the vast floating population driving economic growth in major Chinese cities, and
separatist movements in China's restive west.87 Chinese economic and population pressures increasingly are pushing these constituencies together. 88
Urban spread is rapid; Chinese officials predict that by 2020 "all major
cities will be connected on a 55,000km nationwide grid that will be second
in length only to that of the United States."89 Moreover, China's stated economic goal "is to be a strong and prosperous modernized country with a
higher degree of democracy and civilization."9 All of these factors suggest
that China should pursue some form of democratic reform.
V. WHY THE CITIES?

Accepting the proposition that China should explore ways to become
more democratic, however, does not necessarily validate the idea of democracy in the cities. Indeed, China's own "minor democratic experiments" have
80. POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAM, supra note 46.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Xiao-huang Yin, China's Gilded Age, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1994, at 42.
84. POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAM, supra note 46.
85. Jakobson, supra note 14 ("In its physical appearance and infrastructure, Taipei reminds me of southern mainland cities such as Guangzhou or Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian
province.").
86. Campbell & Mitchell, supra note 15, at 14 ("[T]he longer Taiwanese democracy continues to thrive, the more the CCP fears it may serve as a model for disgruntled segments of
its own populace.").
87. See Hu, supra note 2, at 134-35, 154.
88. Id.
89. Working on the Highway, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2002, at 40, 40.
90. Cooper, supra note 25, at 100.
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gone in the opposite direction, with semi-free local elections at the rural
small-village level.9 Urban residents in China enjoy various privileges and
prerogatives that they stand to lose, at least at the initial phases of democratization.9" Moreover, even in democratic societies, city administrators are not
always elected. The city of London elected its first mayor in its twothousand-year history in 2000.13 Across England, only eight cities recently
supported the notion of electing their leaders.94 But there are powerful reasons to think that any genuine transitional phase must involve Chinese centers of population, rather than the impoverished rural periphery. Urban residents in China are in many ways already freer than rural residents, due to the
move towards, and success of, capitalism in the cities. As a result, city residents are better-positioned to adopt democratic norms. While country towns
are seen as a safe place for experimentation, village-level democracy also is
an attempt to forestall dissent within a rural population that is becoming increasingly aware of widening differences in wealth and economic freedom
within China.9 5 Fear of democracy is driven in significant measure by con96
cerns over allowing relatively uneducated rural Chinese the right to vote.
A. Education
The level of education in Chinese cities is substantially higher than that
in the outlying provinces. "Due to the poor conditions for running schools
and backward education facilities, a great number of [rural] school-age children are unable to go to school or obliged to discontinue their studies, and
the illiteracy rate of the young and middle-aged is high." 97 These structural
impediments do not exist in the cities. More than eighty percent of new urban workers are at least high school graduates. 98 While there is no necessary
correlation between education and the ability to vote, education substantially
increases the likelihood that political institutions will grow more democratic

91. Pei, supra note 51, at 82; see Hu, supra note 2, at 2; Seeds of Change, ECONOMIST,
June 15, 2002, at 7, 7-8.
92. Hu, supra note 2, at 151.
93. Tony Eufinger, "Red" Candidate:London's Likely Mayor Has Socialist-And Eccentric-Leanings, May 3, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/londonmayor000503.html.
94. The Enemy of My Enemy, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 55, 55 ("[T]o help perk up
democracy, Tony Blair hit upon the idea of letting voters elect their own mayors.... The
residents of 23 towns have so far been asked whether they want to elect a mayor; only eight
have endorsed the idea ....).
95. See, e.g., John Pomfret, Bringing Revolution to China's Villages, WASH. POST, Sept.

15, 2002, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-dynlarticles/Al90062002Sepl4.html.
96. Id.
97. POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAM, supra note 46.
98. LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 48.
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as time passes.99 In addition, most theorists agree that an informed electorate
leads to more informed decisions (and, therefore, more responsive decisionmakers).
B. Sophisticationand Stability
Cities are the center of Chinese political life-"Peking has always been
a political city." ' Again, the demographics of urban versus rural China are
compelling. As a consequence of China's increased economic openness, urbanites are in regular contact with foreigners, primarily from Western countries. Their additional exposure to persons living under democratic regimes
should help ease the transition from subject to citizen-voter. "[D]emocracy
encourages stability. The struggle for office is conducted through peaceful
means at regular intervals. Politicians do not need to use violence to get office or keep it. Policies, too, are less liable to sudden change since they are
the product of protracted bargaining among interest groups."' 0 ' The scholarly consensus is that Chinesepeople prefer stability. Democracy institutionalizes a framework for an increasingly sophisticated populace to take a stake
in governance without resorting to protest and violence.
C. UrbanPoliticalPower
Chinese city administrators wield significant authority-probably far
greater than their counterparts in the West. In a recent case, Beijing's city
administrators closed down every Internet caf6 in the city on the pretext that
they were unsafe following a fire in one caf. 1 2 Such fiat power over the
minutiae of day-to-day life could be lessened by democratic oversight without undermining the larger state apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party.
D. Governability
China's leaders have, of late, praised the idea of "grassroots democracy." 103 Democratization, even on a small scale, could act as a safety valve
for dissent° 4-particularly among the growing "floating population" of un-

99. Barro, supra note 37, at 23-24.
100. NATHAN, supra note 6, at 7 (referring to Peking).
101. ld. at 225.
102. See Jiang Zhuqing, Net Cafes Face Ban After Fire Kills 24,

CHINA

DAILY, June 17,

2002, at 1.
103. A Dampened Blaze, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2002, at 46, 46.
104. See NATHAN, supra note 6, at 41 ("The party moved cautiously against the democrats [in 1980] in part because it recognized the value of the safety valve the movement provided during the delicate process of negating the Cultural Revolution."); see also id. at 22425.
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registered urban residents, which is perhaps 100 million strong.105 (Many of
the unregistered are rural peasants who have been encouraged to relocate.16)
Conflict can be controlled through democracy because inherent in its legal
processes is the ability of groups differing socially or ideologically to employ their political voice to effect change rather than resorting to violent or
corrupt means.1 °7 The Chinese government has a significant interest in
avoiding a replay of the Tiananmen Square massacre, particularly in the
lead-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics.' Local-level protests in depressed
urban areas are rising,10 9 and some estimate that the urban unemployment
rate is as high as ten percent.' This increase in unrest is coupled with a decline in the effectiveness of traditional means of urban social control. "For
example, urban neighborhood committees, one of the regime's key means of
monitoring its citizens, have dramatically declined in power and relevance.... [R]ising incomes, a growing private sector, the contraction of
state firms, and the privatization of housing have all conspired to weaken the
neighborhood committee system." '' The same is true of Party control over
the workplace:
In urban China, the Communist Party's roots are weakening fast. In the
late 1990s, the number of city dwellers employed by state-owned enterprises dropped to fewer than half the workforce. As the state sector crumbles, so too do the party branches that once controlled the lives of urban

Chinese.

...In a few years' time, this could mean that in urban China at least, the
party's grassroots activities will be confined mainly to government departments and institutions, in which party membership remains a prerequisite for advancement. 112

If it is true that traditional modalities of urban control are weakening,
the Chinese government has an incentive to implement a system that increases overall political stability without compromising the economic dynamism that characterizes cities like Shanghai. Phrased in somewhat Machiavellian terms, the duty ahead is to guarantee that workers remain disunited-

105. Bates Gill et al., China'sHIV Crisis, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 96, 98-99.
106. POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAM, supra note 46 ("The state encourages and supports

poor peasant households to move out of areas with extremely difficult living conditions to
more favorable areas, which is a new way to solve their food and clothing problem.").
107. ANDREW J. NATHAN, CINESE DEMOCRACY 224 (paperback ed. 1986).
108. See Five Rings for Beijing, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001, at 40, 40-41.
109. See Urban Discontent, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 13, 13 ("China

certainly face growing urban unrest in the years ahead ....

will almost

110. CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 47.

Ill. Gilboy & Heginbotham, supra note 39, at 31.
112. The Withering Away of the Party, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002, at 40, 40.
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directing their grievances at officials of their local governments rather than
at the national leadership." 3 Decoupling local government from the Communist Party would certainly accomplish that aim. After all, democratic
4
processes render government more legitimate in the eyes of the governed.' '
E. Economics
China is not pursuing democratization for its own sake. Because there
appears to be a strong correlation between developed economies and democratic polities, some form of democracy is seen as a way to make socialist
China wealthy and strong." 5 This is a continuing theme in Chinese political
thought, put forward by both the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist) Party
and the Chinese Communist Party." 6 Although democracy might not be a
necessary condition for economic development in undeveloped countries,
citizens in developed countries inevitably demand more representative government at some point. Preventing democratization in developed Chinese cities could lead to upheaval as citizens demand more rights. This turmoil
could undercut China's overall economic development, because the cities are
China's drivers of economic growth.
F. "Acceptable" Politics
It should be remembered that the People's Republic of China at least ostensibly is built on socialist and Marxist-which is to say, left-wingprinciples. Whether the present ruling cadre in China is genuinely devoted to
Communist thought is a matter of conjecture and beyond the scope of this
article. But their nominal devotion to Communism is unchanged. That being
the case, they are likely to be more comfortable with democratic outcomes
that favor the broad agenda of the political Left-and city-based populations
generally are substantially more leftist (if not socialist) in orientation than
their rural or suburban countrymen." 7 After all, Shanghai, China's crown
jewel, was the birthplace of the Chinese Communist Party." 8 If Chinese
city-dwellers can be expected to vote in more reliably left-wing ways than
their rural counterparts, the results of Chinese democracy in the cities should
be more palatable to the Communists running the country. Furthermore, de-

113. Protests but No Bullets, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 37, 37.
114. NATHAN, supra note 6, at 224.
115. Hu, supra note 2, at 130.
116. NATHAN, supra note 6, at xii ("Both viewed democracy as a means to national
wealth and power rather than a method of public control of government."). The Kuomintang,
of course, ruled Taiwan for decades before ceding power in democratic elections. Id.
117. Hu, supra note 2, at 151 ("Peasants are the least advantaged group, but those who
suffer most from tyranny are often its most solid basis.").
118. See http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc (last visited June 24, 2002) (official website
of the Chinese Communist Party).
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mocracy improves a government's quality. It provides an effective means of
and helps avoid (or at least uncover) corrupt
supervising large bureaucracies
9
government leaders. "
VI. ONE COUNTRY, MANY SYSTEMS

The final virtue of urban Chinese democracy is that it could conceivably
ease tensions surrounding Hong Kong, Macau, and (most importantly) Taiwan.
A. Hong Kong

It is generally acknowledged that Hong Kong is the best-functioning of
Chinese cities. Due to its former status as a British colony, Hong Kong enjoys a strong legal system that supports its economy.12 This legal system
differs greatly from Mainland China's. When the British turned Hong Kong
over to the Chinese, residents of Hong Kong had serious misgivings that
their relative political democracy would be crushed, which in turn would
damage the economy.' 2' As a consequence, the United Kingdom initially
was reluctant to honor its commitment to turn pluralistic Hong Kong over to
totalitarian China.
To allay British concerns, the People's Republic promised "One Country, Two Systems": Hong Kong would continue to operate under the laws
created by its Colonial government and be accountable to the Chinese central
government only on matters of foreign affairs and national defense. 122 The
People's Republic promised that there would be no alteration in the governing structure for at least fifty years. 123 Hong Kong's legal system would remain intact; the laws would remain unchanged; the judiciary would continue
to be independent. 24 Indeed, the Basic Law guarantees Hong Kong's immediate democratic future through its disallowance of socialism. 25 Despite
these promises, Great Britain and Mainland China "never gave a voice to the
six million Hong Kong residents whose futures also hang in the balance.' 2 6
119. NATHAN, supra note 6, at 224.
120. Friedman, supra note 17, at 66. "As a British colony, Hong Kong enjoyed a democratic political system and a full, free market economic system." Cooper, supra note 25, at I11.
121. Cooper, supra note 25, at 111.
122. Id.
123. Berring, supra note 8, at 435-36; see Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K., 23 I.L.M.
1366, 1371-72 (1984).
124. Id.
125. Friedman, supra note 17, at 74.
126. Berring, supra note 8, at 431; see Erik Alexander Rapoport, Comment, Extradition
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Will Hong Kong Remain a Separate and

Independent JurisdictionAfter 1997?, 4 ASIAN L.J. 135, 148 (1997) ("[T]he Joint Declaration
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Hong Kong's ultimate aim is to elect a chief executive and legislature
by universal suffrage. 127 Since retrocession, however, the Chinese government has seriously degraded Hong Kong's democracy. Professor Joseph
Cheng observes, "[ilf there is no genuine democracy in China, you can't expect to have genuine democracy in Hong Kong.'1 8 In April 2002, for example, Hong Kong officials refused to admit U.S. citizen Harry Wu, who had
been spuriously charged with "spying for Taiwan" after revealing Chinese
prison labor practices. 29 There is significant pressure from the Mainland to
ban the Falun Gong meditation sect.13 ° Informal government pressure on
journalists and academics is severe.' Nevertheless, Hong Kong remains the
most democratic city in Mainland China, and its continuing appeal to
Mainlanders is demonstrated by the riots following Hong Kong's efforts to
expel "illegal" Mainlanders from the city-state. Thus far, urban democracy
has proved a success: Hong Kong's rule of law, market economy, and democratic values remain largely intact,
even though they directly contradict
32
China's Marxist official ideology.'
Some argue that Hong Kong's political and economic freedom will
eventually infect China, rather than vice versa.' 3 3 There is reason to believe
that China's hesitance in connection with Hong Kong is born of fear that
Hong Kong's democratic contagion will spread to southern sister cities like
Guangzhou and (in particular) Shanghai. Allowing small-scale experiments
in these cities would help bring Hong Kong more fully into Chinese cultural
life-and could eventually form a reservoir for the development of democratic norms further afield.
B. Macau
Like Hong Kong, Macau (a former Portuguese colony) is semiindependent and substantially more free-market than the Chinese Mainland.
was presented to the Hong Kong citizens as a fiat to be accepted in its entirety. There was no
referendum on whether to accept the Joint Declaration or not.").
127. The People's Choice, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 48, 49.
128. Id. at 49.
129. One Country, Two Systems, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2002, at 39, 39.
130. Jiang Almost Meets the Falun Gong, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 45, 45-46.
131. See Petersen, supra note 34, at 341.
132. Friedman, supra note 17, at 97. But see Petersen, supra note 34, at 337 ("Hong
Kong's main governmental institutions, the Chief Executive, the legislature, and the judiciary
have not established themselves as particularly strong defenders of local autonomy.").
133. Friedman, supra note 17, at 68-69.
China's Communist Party has subconsciously put into motion a process of modernity that will revolutionize its economy as well as the politics of its government.
This process will eventually result in the fall of the old Chinese Communist Guard
by giving rise to a new era in Chinese history that is founded on the "rule of law,"
market economics and democratic values.
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But it seems to have been ill-served by political democracy. Because of the
criminal underworld in Macau that emerged under Portuguese control,
Macau residents are much more sympathetic to the authoritarian government
in Beijing than are their counterparts in Hong Kong. 134 Macau's governing
body currently exists in a state of limbo; limited self-determination would
create both an incentive to improve and a mechanism to control these criminal elements.
C. Taiwan
Taiwan and Mainland China will remain separate for the foreseeable future. Taiwan is well-armed and enjoys a comprehensive U.S. security guarantee-more explicitly under the current Bush Administration than at any
prior time. 135 Taiwanese public opinion increasingly favors independence,
even in the face of Chinese saber-rattling. They also reject proposed halfmeasures: "the Hong Kong model will not satisfy the Taiwanese.' ' 136 And the
Mainland seems to have recognized the fact that Taiwan-buoyed by increasingly clear shows of support from the United States-is no longer intimidated by threats of force. As Taiwan prepared for its December 2001
parliamentary elections, for example, the Mainland government abstained
from its customary practice of intimidating
Taiwanese voters into supporting
137
candidates partial to reunification.
The Mainland still exerts a gravitational pull. Taiwanese companies are
clamoring to invest in China,'38 and major cultural ties remain--especially
amongst the ethnic Mainlanders who make up more than half of Taiwan's
population. Economics may force the two together. 39 Some form of loose
confederation can someday be envisioned, but only if China moves substantially toward Taiwan's Western-style norms in areas like press freedom and
political expression. 4 ° Taiwanese leaders still look toward "a relationship
conducive to the peaceful and democratic reunification of the Chinese nation

134. Cooper, supra note 25, at 111.
135. See generally Arms and Studied Ambiguity, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2001, at 40; With
Due Respect, Mr. President.. ., ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2002, at 45; Campbell & Mitchell, su-

pra note 15, at 14 ("Taipei has warmly embraced the increased clarity, stating that the comment made the U.S. commitment to stability in the region 'more convincing"').
136. David Shambaugh, Facing Reality in China Policy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001,

at 50, 52.
137. China Learns to Live with Chen, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2001, at 39, 39.
138. Drifting Together, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2002, at 35, 35.
139. Id.

140. See Shambaugh, supra note 136, at 51 ("The concept of confederation offers the
best hope for an ultimate solution: it would bring the island back into the sovereign fold of
China while guaranteeing substantial autonomy to Taiwan. Indeed, many intellectuals (and
some officials) on both sides of the strait have been actively exploring the implications of the
confederal, federal, and commonwealth models.").
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one day."' 41 Establishing bulwarks of democracy within China would go a
long way toward reassuring the Taiwanese that eventual reunification would
not threaten core Taiwanese values or the Western way of life to which they
have become accustomed.
Without significant movement toward democratization, reunification is
impossible. 4 2 Taiwan's former president Lee Teng-hui writes that
[i]t is fiction to claim that the Chinese nation is not divided-and pernicious fiction to assert that the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) has any
right or imperative to claim sovereignty over Taiwan. The attacks that Beijing makes on the legitimacy of the democratic government affront the
people43 of Taiwan and the prevailing values of the international community. 1

A demonstration that China's one-country, two-systems approach can
succeed in Hong Kong and elsewhere might help set the Taiwanese at
ease.

1
4

VII. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Change does not need to be revolutionary---even in China. Berring
muses that "[p]erhaps the PRC will gradually evolve into a regional confederation" because "[t]he southeastern portion of mainland China clearly
shares interests with Hong Kong and Taiwan. ' 45 A modest move toward local democracy would be a reasonable first step in this evolution, which some
view as inevitable. 46 To that end, some commentators recommend that
China "let some become constitutionalist first" through the exercise of the
rule of law in areas where it is most feasible.'4 7 Local autonomy at the village- and city-levels, already the subject of small-scale experiments, 48 also
might provide an internationally acceptable resolution of the issues sur141. Lee, supra note 14, at 12.
142. Cooper, supra note 25, at 113. "It is likely that the political system in Beijing will
morph to some other form of government before Taiwan can be fully assimilated." Id.
143. Lee, supra note 14, at 10.
144. See generally Friedman, supra note 17. "China needs to demonstrate to the world
that its philosophy of 'one country, two systems' paradigm is a success in order to be able to
one-day fashion a similar plan of reunification with neighboring Taiwan .
I.."
Id. at 70-71.
145. Berring, supra note 8, at 445. A federalist solution for China was mooted as early as
the early 1920s. Hu, supra note 2, at 55.
146. Hu, supra note 2, at 154 ("Although modem technology and nationalism unify
China more than ever, the return of Hong Kong and Macao, the existence of a prosperous and
democratic Taiwan, the separatist tendencies of several ethnic minorities, and more importantly, the increasing power of provinces will force Beijing to adopt federalism.").
147. Edwards, Henkin, Martin & Nathan, supranote 9, at 4 (quoting Deng Xiaoping).
148. Pei, supra note 51, at 77, 82; Hu, supra note 2, at 130-31; see also Daphne Huang,
Comment, The Right to a Fair Trial in China, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 171, 192 (1998)
(suggesting that Chinese officials intend to expand rural experiments with democracy into
urban areas).
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rounding China's uneasy rule in Tibet149-as has recently been suggested by
the Dalai Lama. 5 '
A patchwork of democratic city-states in a sea of totalitarianism may
seem like an odd way to move China toward functioning democracy. But it
would be perhaps the best means of ensuring that China's accession to the
West is carried out at a pace acceptable to the current regime and in a fashion that does not endanger either China's own people or the rest of the
world. A post-communist economy already exists in China.' Democracy in
the cities could guide the way toward a post-communist political system to
match.

149. See generally Vause, supra note 32 (discussing China's presence in Tibet); Melvyn
C. Goldstein, The Dalai Lama's Dilemma, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 83 (describing

the complicated political situation between Tibet and China).
150. Orville Schell, Tibet Issue Is Ripe for Solving, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at M1

("The Dalai Lama has proposed a reasonable compromise: In return for a high degree of Tibetan autonomy and permission to return home to Lhasa, his government in exile would yield
to the Chinese government's claim of sovereignty and its desire to continue controlling Tibet's foreign affairs and defense.").
151. Cooper, supra note 25, at 113.
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